In this paper we present an optimizing-agent model for the euro area to emphasize how the existence of heterogeneity in inflation persistence across regions matters for the design of monetary policy. We find supporting evidence of the existence of such a heterogeneity in inflation dynamics across euro area countries. In particular, based on the estimation of New Keynesian Phillips Curves for five major countries of the euro area, we find that inflation in Germany has a dominant forward-looking component, while in the other group of countries inflation show a significant inertial (backward looking) behavior. Under this circumstance, we study the welfare implications of four monetary policy rules following terms-of-trade shocks: fully optimal, optimal inflation targeting, HICP targeting, and output gap stabilization.
(1999), the main argument for price stability is that it improves the transparency of the relative price mechanism, thereby avoiding distortions and helping to ensure that the market allocates real resources efficiently both across uses and over time.
In this paper, we will present a theoretical framework, which is supported by the empirical evidence, where we can explicitly address such an issue.
We formulate a two-region optimizing-agent model. In one region, sellers behave as in the standard Calvo (1983) model in which firms that are allowed to reset their prices take into account their expected discounted value of profits showing then a forward-looking behavior. In the other region, among the firms that are allowed to change their prices, a fraction follows a forward-looking behavior while the other fraction follows a rule of thumb showing a backward-looking behavior. In this region past inflation also plays a crucial role in understanding inflation dynamic. To calibrate our model, we estimate New Keynesian Phillips Curves for the five major countries of the euro area. We find evidence pointing out the existence of two different zones inside the euro area. There is one country (Germany) where we cannot reject that inflation has a significant forward-looking component. The other group of countries is formed by France, Italy, Spain, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, where inflation dynamics are mixed by forward-and backwardlooking components.
We then exploit the micro-foundations of our framework in order to provide a welfare criterion for the Central Bank in terms of the utility of the consumers. The policymaker seeks to stabilize the output gap as well as a weighted average of inflation rates in the area. Moreover, importance should be given to the deviation of the relative price between regions with respect to the natural level. Given the role of past inflation in understanding inflation persistence in the area, monetary policymakers should also stabilize the growth in the inflation rate in the region characterized by the hybrid model. Within this framework we analyze both the dynamic adjustment of the driving macroeconomic variables in the regions and area to terms-of-trade shocks, as well as the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules. We focus on four alternative policy rules: (1) fully optimal policy, (2) optimal inflation targeting policy, (3) Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)-targeting, and (4) stabilization of the area output gap.
We show within our framework that, in principle, a quantitative target in terms of stabilization of the HICP does not succeed in eliminating the distortions in the relative price mechanism. We have proposed two policies that may perform better: the optimal inflation targeting policy (the inflation rate in the region with a combined higher degree of price rigidity and backward-looking behavior should receive higher weight), which generalizes that outlined in Benigno (2004) , and the output-gap stabilization policy. Nevertheless, we argue that the applicability of these policies has pros and cons, making it not so straightforward to move from HICP-targeting to other forms of targets. In particular, the architects of the ECB have specified a broad target, HICP inflation less than 2%, so as to give flexibility to the monetary policymakers in conducting their policy. Around this target, policymakers can have the discretion that allows them to evaluate in an appropriate way the different sources of rigidity of the inflation rate, without necessarily disclosing them to the public. In addition, as our analysis shows, in cases where inertia in the terms of trade is high, monitoring the area output gap can also provide the right information on the final goal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we present the theoretical framework. In Section 2 we find empirical support to our characterization of inflation dynamics across five euro area countries. Section 3 presents the AS equation. In Section 4 we follow the recent literature on monetary policy evaluation and we exploit the micro-foundations of our model in order to provide a welfare criterion for the Central Bank based on the utility of the consumers. Section 5 is devoted to compare the adjustment of the macroeconomic variables of the model in response to terms-of-trade shocks under alternative monetary regimes both from positive and normative viewpoints using our previous parameter estimates. Finally, we present some conclusions in Section 6.
THE MODEL
In this section we present a model of a currency area along the lines of Benigno (2004) . We model a currency area with two regions labeled H and F. This analysis extends Benigno (2004) by considering two different price-setting mechanisms for the two regions. In region F sellers behave as in the standard Calvo (1983) model in which firms that are allowed to reset their prices take into account their expected discounted value of profits showing then a forward-looking behavior; instead region H is characterized by the hybrid model of Galí and Gertler (1999) where among the firms that are allowed to change their prices a fraction follows a forwardlooking behavior, while the other fraction follows a rule of thumb showing a backward-looking behavior. As it will be shown later, in this region past inflation also plays a crucial role in understanding inflation dynamic.
The whole area is populated by a continuum of agents on the interval [0, 1] with no possibility of migration across regions.
1 A generic agent, belonging to the area, is both consumer and supplier of working hours: a consumer of all the goods produced in both regions and a supplier of working hours to one of the firms that produce differentiated goods. Households maximize the expected discounted value of the utility flow. Preferences of the generic household j are given by
where the upper index j denotes a variable that is specific to agent j, while the upper index i denotes a variable that is specific to region i. We have that i ϭ H if 1. Benigno (2004) considers a model in which the price mechanism follows a Calvo's model in both regions. Details of the model are in Benigno (2004) .
2. We assume that there is a measure one of agents of type j.
]. E t denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at date t, while β is the intertemporal discount factor, with 0 Ͻ β Ͻ 1. Agents obtain utility from the consumption index C (through the function U(·)), while they derive disutility from supplying hours, N, to the production of the differentiated product j (through the function Ṽ (·)). The utility function is separable into these two arguments. The consumption index C is a Cobb-Douglas function of the consumption bundles of home and foreign goods, which are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators, with elasticity of substitution σ, of the continuum of goods (of measure n and 1 Ϫ n, respectively) produced in the respective regions.
We assume that the asset markets are complete both at a regional and interregional level and that the law of one price holds for all the varieties of goods traded.
3
These assumptions imply that consumptions are equated across regions. Moreover, given that the consumption index is common across regions, it follows that the consumption-based price index P is equal across regions.
4
Agents of type j works for the firm j which produces a differentiated good according to the production function y
t is a region-specific productivity shock and g(·) is a standard concave function. Firms are wage takers but are monopolists in setting their prices. In region F, prices are subjected to changes at random intervals as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) . In each period a seller faces a fixed probability 1 Ϫ α F of adjusting its price, irrespective of how long it has been since the seller had changed its price, with 0 ≤ α F Ͻ 1. In this event the price is chosen to maximize the expected discounted profits under the circumstance that the decision on the price is still maintained; in fact the seller also considers that the price chosen at a certain date t will apply in the future at date t ϩ k with probability (α
It is important to note that all the sellers that belong to the same region and that can modify their price at a certain time will face the same discounted future demands and future marginal costs under the hypothesis that the new price is maintained. Thus they will set the same price. We denote with p t (f) the price of the good f chosen at date t and with ỹ t,tϩk (f) the total demand of good f at time t ϩ k under the circumstances that the price p t (f) still applies. The function to maximize is
where Q t,tϩk is the appropriate stochastic discount factor to evaluate nominal income at time t ϩ k in units of nominal income at time t; τ F is a proportional tax on sales and w t (f) is the nominal wage faced by firm f. The optimal choice of price yields to 3. As it is shown in Cole and Obstfeld (1992) inter-regional asset markets are in any case redundant with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
4. For these reasons, we can eliminate indexes that identify regions when we write prices and consumptions.
where MC t,tϩk (f) are the nominal marginal costs of firm f at time t ϩ k under the assumption that the price chosen at time t still holds. They are defined as 
In what follows we can define the average marginal costs in region F as
where
where T denotes the terms of trade (as the price of the foreign bundles of goods with respect to the price of the home bundle, i.e. T ≡ P F րP H ) and n is the share of goods produced in region H in the consumption bundles. Moreover the function V(·) is defined by
As shown in the Appendix, in a log-linear approximation around a zero inflation steady state, Equations (2) and (3) imply
(1 ϩ ησ)), and upper-bar variables denote steady-state values. With a hat variable, we denote the deviation of the variable from the steady state.
5
In region H, the price-setting mechanism involves a form of a hybrid model as in Galí and Gertler (1999) . As in the Calvo's model a mass of firms of measure 1 Ϫ α H is allowed to reset their prices, with 0 ≤ α H Ͻ 1. However, only a mass 1 Ϫ ω of these firms is going to re-optimize in a forward-looking manner as in the Calvo's model 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. They will set their prices as it follows
The remaining mass of firms, of measure ω, that are allowed to change their prices follows instead a rule-of-thumb behavior in which the chosen price is set as 5. In the steady-state
and T ϭ 1. This symmetry has the non-innocous implication that the elasticities ρ and η will be common across regions. In this study we focus instead on asymmetries that originate from differences in the price-setting behavior.
where P * H,t denotes the prices that are chosen newly in period t, which includes both the forward-looking and rule-of-thumb prices and is defined as
Finally the law of motion of the price index P H,t is given at time t by
We define the average real marginal costs in region H as
As shown in the Appendix, in a zero steady state inflation, a log-linear approximation of Equations (6)- (9) yield to
. Equation (10) shows that an important implication of the hybrid model is that past inflation plays a role in the inflation dynamics. Moreover, all the structural parameters are affected by the presence of backward-looking firms. The specification in Equation (10) yields the forward-looking model when ω ϭ 0.
EVIDENCE ON INFLATION PERSISTENCE IN EURO-AREA COUNTRIES
Although Equations (5) and (10) do not exploit all the information implied by the general equilibrium model, they can be of interest since they relate the inflation process in each country only to the respective real marginal costs. The aim of this section is to use data on the inflation rates and real marginal costs to study whether inflation persistence is an important feature of euro-area countries. To accomplish this objective, we estimate Equations (5) and (10) and study whether we can group countries according to whether in the data the inflation dynamics can be better described by Equation (5) or Equation (10). We use our estimation to calibrate some parameters of the model while other parameters are chosen in line with studies in the literature.
Since the specification of Equation (5) is nested in Equation (10), we focus our estimation on Equation (10), which can be generically written as
for parameters and variables already defined. Here, our empirical strategy follows recent empirical works by Sbordone (2001) , Sbordone (2002) , Galí and Gertler (1999) , and Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) that have recently shown that the New Phillips Curve (NPC) based on real marginal costs can well account for the inflation dynamics in the U.S. and in the euro area. We use quarterly time series data for the five major countries in EMU (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) over the period 1970:I-1997:I. All the data are from the OECD Business Sector Database and are available upon request. Our measure of output is real GDP, prices are measured using GDP deflator, nominal wages are measured using total compensation, and employment is total employment. In Figure 1 we plot, for each country in our sample and for the euro area, annual inflation as well as our measure of average real marginal cost, i.e. the log of real unit labor costs. 6 As it is clear from the figure, both variables move closely together, at least at medium frequencies in all the countries, and so in the euro area. In general, our measure of real marginal costs matches the high inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s, and the long disinflationary period of the late 1980s and the 1990s. This is particularly true in the case of France, where it is easy to see that inflation anticipates future movements in marginal costs, as the model predicts.
Since γ b , γ f , and λ are particular non-linear functions of primitive parameters of the model, we can aim to estimate at most three of them. We decide to estimate α, ω, and β. In particular by estimating α, we can also retrieve the average duration of price contracts, a measure of price rigidity, in each country. In our model, α measures the fraction of price setters that is not allowed to adjust their prices and in particular D ϭ 1ր(1 Ϫ α) measures the average duration of prices contracts, ω measures the fraction of firms that are allowed to change their prices but that follow a rule-of-thumb behavior; finally β is the discount factor in the consumer preferences. Instead, we calibrate the parameter σ equal to 6, which corresponds to a steady-state mark-up µ ≡ σր(σ Ϫ 1) of 1.2 and we set the inverse of the elasticity of substitution in consumption, ρ, equal to 1/6 as in the recent work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . The elasticity of the disutility of producing the differentiated goods, η, is set equal to 0.6.
7 Considering a reasonable value of the share of labor in total output of 0.75, then the implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply is equal to 5. 6. The data for the euro area are from Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) . 7. Notice that under our assumptions, the parameters η and ρ are common across countries. It is not easy to find evidence on cross-country differences in those parameters. Notwithstanding, our empirical results are robust to changes in these parameters. To see this, notice that the slope coefficient of the Phillips curve (see Equations 13 and 14) depends on the ratio ρ ϩ η 1 ϩ ση . Under our baseline calibration this ratio is equal to 0.16. Assuming that σ ϭ 10, ρ ϭ 1ր4, and η ϭ 0.2 (i.e. reducing the steady state markup, increasing the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and reducing the Frisch labor supply elasticity) yields an adjustment equal to 0.15 instead of 0.16, so it only marginally influences our estimates of the degree of price stickiness. See, for more details Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) .
8. This value is in line with most of the authors in the RBC literature. Actually, our value of 5 is lower than the value used by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) , and it is clearly lower than infinite which is the value that corresponds to Hansen's model of indivisibilities (Hansen 1985) . Nevertheless, these values are higher than the ones emerging from the microeconometric estimates of the labor supply literature, e.g., see Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) . In order to estimate the structural parameters we follow Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) . We use Equation (11) as orthogonality condition, so that we can estimate the model using generalized method of moments (GMM). Let z t denote a vector of variables observed at time t. Then, under rational expectations, these equations define the following set of orthogonality conditions:
which corresponds to Equation (11). Our set of instruments, z t , includes four lags of inflation, the real marginal cost (i.e. real unit labor costs), detrended output, and wage inflation. 10 We also check the robustness of our results to (1) changes in the instruments set, in particular we will also estimate the model using four lags on inflation and only two lags of wage inflation, output, and marginal cost; (2) setting the discount factor γ ϭ 1, so that γ f ϩ γ b ϭ 1.
In Table 1 we present the results for the hybrid model over the period 1970:1-1997:1, which allows us to test directly against the hypothesis of backward-looking inflation inertia. The first three columns report the estimates of the two primitive parameters, ω, α, and the discount factor β; while the fourth to sixth columns report the reduced form coefficients γ b and γ f , and the slope coefficient on real marginal cost λ. Finally, in the last two columns we display the index of price rigidity (i.e. the duration of price being fixed) and the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. We also present alternative estimates, in the rows, corresponding to different instruments set. In particular, the first set of instruments are inflation, detrended output, real unit labor costs, and wage inflation from t Ϫ 1 to t Ϫ 4; and in the second one we use five lags of inflation and two lags of the rest of variables.
The degree of price stickiness is well estimated in all countries. The most interesting feature that emerges from this table is that two different groups of countries emerge. The first group is basically represented by Germany, for which we find no evidence of backward lookingness in the inflation equation. This country represents around 35% of the GDP of the area. The rest of the countries (France, Italy, Spain, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands) form a more compact group in which, although the forward-looking component is slightly more relevant, the backward-looking component plays a significant role. These four countries represent around 53% of the GDP of the area.
11 Accordingly to these results, we can then calibrate the size of region H to n ϭ 0.6 while the size of region F will be (1 Ϫ n) ϭ 0.4. Finally, notice that the estimated probability of changing prices, i.e. the duration of prices being fixed, is quite similar in all countries.
9. We include a constant term in the regression, and the variables are deviations from the sample mean, see e.g. Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) .
10. If the elasticity of output with respect to labor is constant in the production function, then real marginal costs can be measured by the real unit labor cost. Hence, alternative specifications of the production function would lead to alternative measures, see for instance Galí and Gertler (1999) . As stressed by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) , we control for the presence of measurement error in our measure of real marginal costs. In doing that, in the following analysis, the standard errors are robust to the presence of correlation up to order eight (Newey-West correction).
11. The weights are the following: France, 22.3; Italy, 15.5; Spain, 8.5 ; and the Netherlands, 5.7. In addition, the rest of the parameters of the model are quite well estimated and in line with the previous results by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) , with the exception of the discount factor, β, which is rather low in most of the countries. Hence, the last row corresponds to the estimated parameters of the model by imposing β ϭ 1 in our estimation. As can be seen, most of the previous results carry over under such an alternative specification, though the slope coefficient on the marginal costs is now somewhat less precisely estimated.
We evaluate the implicit average duration in the group of countries where the backward-looking component is a significant determinant of inflation persistence, by using the following weighted average:
w i , where i represents the country and w i is the consumption weight of country i in total consumption in the area. Using the results in Table 1 , the corresponding average duration in this backward-looking area is around one year (4 quarters). This value is also very similar to the estimates for Germany. Nevertheless, we try to evaluate the higher heterogeneity existing among France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands by calculating, for each country, two durations that bound 95% of the empirical estimates (i.e. D ± 2 se, where se are the corresponding standard errors in row (2)-see Table 1 ).
Using these values we can obtain an upper and a lower value of the average duration in the group of backward-looking countries. This exercise yields a duration of between 3.4 and 4.5 quarters for that set of countries. Finally, notice that in this area, as opposed to Germany, the fraction of rule-of-thumb price setters ranges from 0.4 to almost 0.8 for the Spanish economy, which is the crucial difference we emphasize in order to calibrate our theoretical model.
Finally, given the changes that have taken place in European monetary policy, in Figure 2 we present the structural estimates, resulting from a rolling regression starting at the beginning of the nineties, of the degree of price stickiness (i.e. α and ω, respectively) for each country.
12 As can be seen, our estimates of α are fairly stable, showing that by using the model we are able to identify this coefficient as a fairly structural one. A similar conclusion arises for the estimated backward-looking parameter (ω) with a small symptom of instability in the case of Germany. In this country we find limited evidence of backward lookingness at the beginning of the nineties, but the parameter progressively diminishes to nil at the end of the sample period.
AGGREGATE SUPPLY EQUATIONS
Having calibrated the parameters of the model, we now complete the characterization of our model. As it is shown in the appendix, Equation (4) implies in a loglinear approximation that 12. We did estimate recursively the coefficients using data from the beginning of the sample until 1990, and then we add data one period at a time until the end sample period is reached. The estimates correspond to the case where we use the first set of instruments (rows 1 in Table 1 ), and the coefficient β is freely estimated. The results are robust to both circumstances. 
where ρ ϭ Ϫ U CC C րU C and Ŷ W t denotes the area output, in deviation with respect to the steady state, as a weighted average with weights n and (1 Ϫ n) of home and foreign outputs; Ỹ W t and T t denote the flexible-price area output and terms of trade, in deviations with respect to the steady state and they are defined as
where Â i t is defined in the Appendix. Using Equation (12) in Equation (5), we can write the aggregate supply equation for region F as
As in the corresponding closed-economy version, inflation depends on present and expected future values of the real marginal costs. However, in an open-economy framework, the real marginal costs are not proportional to the output gap, as a consequence of the interdependence induced by the international relative prices. This result was first shown by Svensson (2000) . The smaller and more open the country is, the more relative prices influence the real marginal costs and thus inflation rates.
In a log-linear approximation the average marginal costs for the hybrid country H can be written as
We can then write the aggregate supply equation for region H as
In what follows, the only other structural equation that is needed to perform our welfare comparisons is the terms of trade identity, which relates the growth of the terms of trade to the inflation differential
POLICY OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
Here we follow the recent literature on monetary policy evaluation and we exploit the micro-foundations of our model in order to provide a welfare criterion for the Central Bank based on the utility of the consumers. 13 This criterion allows for a direct evaluation of the deadweight losses implied by the distortions included in the model. As a welfare criterion, we assume the discounted sum of the utility flows of the households belonging to the whole union. The average utility flow is defined as
at each date t, where it has been implicitly assumed that each region has a weight equal to its economic and population size. The welfare criterion of the whole union is then defined as
Following the method of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2002) , (Woodford 2003a ) and the analysis of (Benigno 2004) we compute a second-order Taylor series expansion of W around the deterministic steady state. Our secondorder approximation delivers an intuitive representation of the welfare function:
where Ω, Λ, Γ, θ, and ψ are functions of the structural parameters of the model.
14 From Equation (16), it follows that monetary policymakers should stabilize the output gap, y
e. the deviations of area output from its natural rate, as well as the deviations of the terms of trade T t from their natural rate T t . Indeed, following an asymmetric shock, efficiency requires that relative prices should be moved in order to shift the burden of adjustment "equally" across regions. Monetary policymakers should also stabilize a weighted average of the squares of the producer inflation rates in each region. However, there is a trade-off between stabilizing 13. See, for instance Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , Woodford (2002) , (Woodford (2003a) , and Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) .
14. The parameteres are defined in the Appendix. An appendix on the details of the derivation is available online. In particular in the derivation we assume that a taxation subsidy is in place to offset the steady-state monopolistic distortions. inflation in both regions and stabilizing relative prices to their natural level, in fact since prices adjust sluggishly within a region, the terms of trade cannot be moved to offset asymmetric shocks. This trade-off is further amplified by the last term in the loss function. Given the importance of past inflation for understanding inflation persistence in the area, as in Steinsson (2003) and Amato and Laubach (2003) , we obtain that monetary policymakers should also stabilize the growth of inflation in the hybrid region H. This term follows from the presence in this region of backwardlooking agents that behave according to the rule of thumb. In the case in which the fraction of backward-looking agents becomes zero, the last term disappears and the welfare criterion collapses to the one in Benigno (2004) .
In the optimal plan monetary policymakers are committed to maximize the welfare function (Equation 16 ) under the constraints given by the structural Equations (13)- (15) and the initial condition T Ϫ1 . Finally, we consider that the economy is subject to terms of trade shocks that follow a Markovian process of the kind:
where we set r ϭ 0.9. As a result of the micro-foundation of the model, these termsof-trade shocks originate from asymmetric supply shocks. The value chosen for r is consistent with the calibration used in the international business cycle literature, e.g. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) . Because of the existing trade-off, the optimal plan is highly complicated. We do not go into the details of the characterization of the optimal plan. Instead in the next section, we compare the outcome of the optimal plan with that of other, simpler, rules.
POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the adjustment of the macroeconomic variables of the model in response to terms-of-trade shocks under alternative monetary regimes both from positive and normative viewpoints using the previous estimations and calibrations. In particular, we focus on four alternative policy rules. The first policy under consideration is the fully optimal policy. Formally, this implies that monetary policymakers are committed to maximizing the welfare function (16) under the constraints given by the structural Equations (13)- (15) at each point in time, given T Ϫ1 and the process for T t .
The second class is the optimal inflation targeting policy in which the monetary policymaker is committed to stabilize a weighted average of the GDP inflation rates of the two regions
where δ is chosen optimally to maximize the welfare criterion (Equation 16) subject to the structural Equations of the model (13)- (15) at each point in time, given T Ϫ1 and the process for T t . The third policy that we consider is the HICP targeting which belongs to the previous class where the parameter δ is set equal to the size of the H country, say n. 15 It is always the case that optimal policy performs at least as well as the optimal inflation targeting policy, while the latter is always at least as good as HICP-targeting.
As shown in Benigno (2004) , in a model in which both regions have price setters that behave in a forward-looking manner, in the event the degrees of rigidity are the same across the two regions, the optimal choice of δ will be equal to n, which is the size of region H. Each region's inflation rate receives a weight equal to its economic size (i.e. this coincides with HICP targeting). We now investigate in this more general model where region H is characterized by a hybrid aggregate supply equation, how the existence of backward-looking firms affects the weights of the optimal inflation targeting policy. To answer this question, we use our estimates of the parameters α H ,α F , and ω. Given the uncertainty surrounding our estimates, in Table 2 we provide a sensitivity analysis on how alternative degrees of stickiness in both areas would affect the optimal δ, for alternative values of the parameter ω that are in the range of our empirical estimates. In particular, in the forward-looking area, we consider that the degree of rigidity can vary between 3 and 4 quarters, while in the hybrid region the duration is somewhat higher, so we consider that this rigidity is between 4 and 5 quarters.
In our calibrated example, HICP targeting would require giving each region a weight equal to the size of the region, 0.6 to region H and 0.4 to region F. As in Benigno (2004) , we found that this is the optimal policy when D F ϭ D H ϭ 4 and ω ϭ 0. However, the presence of backward-looking firms matter for the optimal weight to give to each region in a considerable way, as ω increases higher weight should be given to the inflation rate in the region in which there are also backwardlooking firms.
Our empirical results suggest that for the group of "hybrid" countries ω can be estimated between 0.4 and 0.8. As it is shown in the table, taking into consideration 15. HICP stands for Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. The HICP inflation of the whole euro area is constructed as a weighted average of the HICP of the single countries belonging to the union, with weights equal to the share of the country's consumption in the consumption of the area. A kind of HICP targeting can be seen as the policy followed by the European Central Bank (Alesina et al. 2001). this parameter changes the optimal weight to be given to the inflation rates in the "hybrid" countries by 0.15-0.2 points. This analysis also suggests that HICP targeting will perform much worse when there are backward-looking firms because it fails to take into account in a proper way the asymmetries between the regions. Moreover, it does not only matter how frequently prices change, but also how they do change.
Finally, we further analyze a policy aimed at stabilizing the output gap of the area, i.e. setting y W t ϭ 0 at all dates t. Notice that within the theoretical framework described above, this policy can be easily ranked in terms of the previous ones when both regions have only forward-looking agents. To see this let us consider Equations (13) and (14) under the assumption that ω ϭ 0. It can be shown that, in this case, the policy that stabilizes the output gap coincides with a policy within the class of the inflation-targeting policies where the weight δ is chosen to be:
Thus, it is then the case that by stabilizing the area output gap, policymakers are implicitly pursuing an inflation-targeting policy, not an optimal one. However, we will show that the stabilization of the output gap in the area performs at least as well as HICP-targeting, given that the weights to the inflation rates are adjusted as to give greater weight to the region with a higher degree of rigidity in the area (see Equation 18 ). In particular, the weight given to region H is higher the greater the size of this economy (higher n), and the higher the degree of flexibility of region F in response to terms-of-trade movements (i.e. higher k F T ). Things are more complicated when ω is different from zero. Under such circumstances, the output-gap stabilization policy is no longer nested in the class of the inflation-targeting policy.
Welfare Comparisons
A numerical quantification appears in Table 3 , where we present the welfare comparisons among all the above-mentioned policies. We set the parameters α F , α H , and ω using the estimation of Section 2 as α F ϭ 0.785, α H ϭ 0.75, and ω ϭ 0.48. 16 We summarize the comparisons in terms of the variability of the variables 16. These values correspond to our estimates presented in the first row (1) of Table 1 . For the forwardlooking region, the coefficient corresponds to the one of Germany, while for the hybrid region are weighted average of the estimated coefficients for France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. that are relevant for the computation of welfare, using the statistic v(·). This operator, v(·), applied to the generic variable x, is defined as follows:
where, as in Woodford (2003b) , the unconditional expectations E are taken over the possible initial states of the economy T 0 . By using this operator, it is possible to analyze welfare, W, as a composite of the operator v(·) applied to the relevant variables. Thus, we are able to understand the contribution of the relative volatilities of inflation and output to welfare under alternative policy rules. In particular, we can decompose welfare in five components: first, the output gap of the area v(y W ); second, the output-gap differential or the terms of trade gap v(T Ϫ T )
17
; third and fourth, the contributions of inflation in both areas, i.e. v(π F ) and v(π H ) , respectively; and finally, the changes in inflation in the sticky inflation area (i.e. the area where the hybrid model applies) v(∆π H ).
As shown in Table 3 we have ranked welfare starting from the worst policy, HICP-targeting, and ending with the fully optimal one. In particular, we provide a measure of the losses in terms of permanent percentage shift in steady-state consumption. To this end, we define the index χ j as
where W E is welfare under the efficient policy, which is not feasible; 18 W j is welfare indexed by the four policies that are considered in this experiment. Thus χ j measures the permanent percentage shift in steady-state consumption that is lost under the policy j with respect to the efficient level. Table 3 summarizes the comparisons, where the variance of the shock ε has been normalized to one. However, the variance of ε is crucial for evaluating the magnitude of the costs in terms of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption. In keeping with the international real business cycle literature, we calibrate the variance of ε to be 0.01 2 . Using the measure χ, we have then evaluated the costs of the fully optimal policy to be around 0.0148% of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption.
19 Output-gap stabilization approximates the welfare that would be 17. Notice that the output gap differential is proportional to the terms-of-trade gap, i.e. formally the following relationship holds:
18. The efficient policy corresponds to a policy in which T t ϭ T t and Ŷ W t ϭ Ỹ W t and π H,t ϭ π F,t ϭ 0 at all times. This allocation is only feasible when there are multiple currencies and when independent policymakers can coordinate on that allocation. In particular our analysis below can also evaluate how costly it is for a currency area to lose the exchange rate as an instrument for stabilizing asymmetric shocks. However, the analysis of this stylized model does not aim at fully characterizing the costs and benefits of the currency area since we are missing other relevant elements of the debate, as the effects on trade and portfolio allocations.
19. Lucas (1987) has evaluated the costs of the business cycle to be around 0.05% of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption.
achieved under the optimal policy. The optimal inflation-targeting policy performs considerably better than HICP-targeting but less than the optimal policy and outputgap stabilization policy. Indeed, the costs of the HICP targeting and the optimal inflation targeting policies are of the order of 0.023 and 0.020%, respectively. The output stabilization policy is quite close to the fully optimal one since much of the welfare gain in the fully optimal policy arises from the fact that the output gap is almost fully stabilized in the area. Notice also that in the fully optimal policy the output gap of the area is not fully stabilized but the relative output gaps or the terms of trade are much more stabilized than in the case of the output gap stabilization policy. Inflation-targeting policies are far enough from the previous two policies because they imply that the output gap of the area is far from stabilized.
An interesting observation is that all the policies under consideration perform equally in terms of the variance of the terms-of-trade gap. Given the high degree of price rigidity, and the persistence of the relative price shock, the terms of trade can adjust only slowly. Hence, monetary policy cannot efficiently stabilize asymmetric shocks across regions. In terms of the welfare function (16), it can control only the area output gap and, marginally, the inflation rates in each region. However, for this calibrated example, the weights on the inflation rates are of an order of magnitude 100 times larger than the weights on the output gap, thus they matter far more for the maximization of welfare. Interestingly, in our case, the output gap policy does not imply high variability of the inflation rates in both regions. We further study how the results change in the case we assume higher persistence of the terms of trade shocks. With values of r ϭ 0.95 and 0.98, we find that the costs of the optimal policy are of the order of 0.024 and 0.038%, respectively, while HICP targeting performs at 0.036 and 0.057%. The welfare costs increase with the persistence of the shocks, thus the gap between alternative policies becomes larger.
Impulse Responses to Terms of Trade Shocks
To gain intuition on the previous results, in Figure 3 we plot the impulse response functions of the inflation rates in each region and of the area output gap following a negative shock to the terms of trade, namely an unexpected transitory drop in T . This shock can be interpreted as a decrease in productivity in country H relative to country F. Efficiency would require that terms-of-trade changes offset completely terms of trade shocks, without any movements in domestic inflation rates and output gaps. However, in a currency area, such efficient equilibrium is not feasible. After the terms-of-trade shocks, inflation in region H increases, while decreases in region F. Under the HICP-targeting regime, inflation increases more in region H and decreases less in region F than under the optimal plan. In fact, HICP targeting does not adjust for the differences in the degrees of rigidity across countries. On the other hand, the optimal inflation-targeting policy gives a higher weight to the inflation rate in region H, hence it succeeds in stabilizing the inflation more in that region. However, it fails in stabilizing the area output gap. HICP-targeting further exacerbates fluctuations in the area output gap. In our calibrated-estimated economy, the fully optimal plan requires quasi-stabilization of the output-gap at the area wide level. It is then the case that the policy of stabilizing the area output-gap can approximate the optimal plan well. By stabilizing the area output-gap, it is also possible to reach the right inertia in inflation rates that the optimal policy requires, so the path of the inflation rates is also stabilized.
However, this result is not robust to alternative calibration of the model. In particular, Figure 4 shows a case in which output-gap targeting is destabilizing. In these figures, we have assumed that the forward-looking component in the hybrid region is such that αmay perform better than the previous one: the optimal inflation targeting policy, which re-weighs countries for the degree of rigidity and the fraction of backwardlooking firms; and the output-gap stabilization policy.
An inflation targeting policy that assigns higher weight to countries with higher degrees of inflation persistence is beneficial for those countries since it produces lower inflation rates for them simply because it cares more about those inflation rates. Indeed, when there are asymmetric shocks, movements in the prices of the more flexible regions should bring about the adjustment. However, a rigidity-adjusted inflation-targeting policy may create the wrong incentives for the adoptions by the countries of structural changes that reduce their goods and labor market rigidities.
The policy of stabilizing the output gap is immune to this adverse-incentive criticism as it gives a weight to each country similar to its economic size as in the HICP-targeting policy. Our analysis shows that, in cases where the inertia in the terms of trade is high and there are important backward-looking components in inflation in some zones of the area, monitoring the output gap can give the right information on the final goal. However, we have further shown that this policy is less robust across different parametrizations, and in some cases may perform worse than HICP targeting. Moreover, it is more difficult to implement since it involves the unobservability of the natural level of output. While, in our context, the natural level indicates the flexible-price equilibrium, there are several other concepts of the natural rate as well as several ways to measure it, as outlined also in McCallum (2001) . Thus, a policy of stabilization of the output gap is neither easy to implement nor to communicate to private agents.
These arguments suggest that it may not be desirable to abandon HICP-targeting for optimal inflation targeting as defined in this paper. Nevertheless, it also emphasizes that inflation differentials are not irrelevant for monetary policy. First, we have to be conscious of the welfare costs associated to the distribution of inflation across countries; and second, cross country inflation analysis may provide useful information as far as the degree of inertia and structural condition differ across countries. (5), (10), (13), and (14) We start from Equation (2) 
APPENDIX Derivation of Equations
where we have further used the fact that with Cobb-Douglas preferences P ϭ P As in (Woodford 2003a , chapter 3), we can take a log-linear approximation to Equation (19) around a steady-state in which p t (f)րP F,t ϭ 1 P F,tϩk րP F,t ϭ 1 for all t and k Ͼ 0 and obtain that
where we have defined p t (f) ϭ lnp t (f)րP F,t and π F,t ≡ lnP F,t րP F,tϪ1 and hats denote log-deviation of the variables from the steady state. We note from Equations (20)- (22) , where η ≡ V yy Ȳ րV y . We can write Equation (24) as
Moreover, log-linearizing Equation (23) we obtain that
which can be combined with Equation (25) to obtain that
where we have defined
Equation (26) coincides with Equation (5) in the main text. Similar steps can be done for the optimal price condition in region H to obtain 
However, recalling Equations (7)- (9), we have now that
